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THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT PRIORITY IN CORPORATE
RECAPITALIZATION
INVESTMENT contracts commonly recognize two ways in which the inves-
tor is compensated for his risk-taking. If the enterprise should succeed, the
shareholder will receive a return out of earnings, and the creditor will receive
his capital back at a fixed or determinate date; if the enterprise should fail,
the investor will be paid upon liquidation out of the proceeds of the sale of
corporate assets. In either case the investment contract provides for priority
in the distribution of earnings or assets according to the position of the se-
curity in the hierarchy of the corporate securities determined by the amount
and terms of investment. A succession of lean years may, however, confront
a corporation with a serious dilemma. To pay interest on bonded indebted-
ness or to pay off dividend arrearages out of earnings may so deplete funds
that operating expenses cannot be met; to put off payment may so injure
the market position of the corporation's securities that new money, needed
for future production, will not be forthcoming, and serious business difficul-
ties, perhaps insolvency, may result. Under such circumstances, a method of
rewriting the liability side of the corporate balance sheet to reflect the cor-
poration's changed financial condition is necessary to attract new investment
and to preserve the corporation as a going concern.' Reorganization and
1. W. & J. SLOANE, NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS, Oct. S, 1944,
Open Letter, is typical of explanations offered stockholders as reasons for a proposed re-
capitalization. See also Note (1941) 89 U. of PA. L. REv. 789, 790; Comment (1941) 39
MIcE. L. REv. 1201, 1203.
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recapitalization are two means of accomplishing this end. Both involve in
substance the issuance of new securities for old, the term "reorganization"
being generally used to include exchanges which affect debt and "recapitali-
zation" those which involve only stock interests.2
Investment contracts are usually drafted with reference only to distribu-
tions on liquidation, which rarely take place. They do not often e.xpressly
provide for priorities in the distribution of new securities in case of reorgani-
zation or recapitalization. In reorganization, it has finally been agreed that
contractual priorities are to be respected.3 No plan is "fair and equitable"
unless senior claims in the hierarchy of corporate securities are "fully com-
pensated" before junior claims participate in the reorganization. 4 Thus,
where assets are insufficient to cover more than unpaid interest on bonds,
junior creditors and stockholders will receive nothing. While the application
of the rule is not without ambiguity, especially where an effort is made to
achieve plans which are "feasible" as well as "fair and equitable," the rule
is now finally securely enthroned.
Recapitalization and reorganization are functional equivalents. Both are
means of recasting the security structure to meet basic changes in the value
The SEC listing of purposes of recapitalizations is perhaps the most comprehensive:
"The stated reasons advanced by the management for the plans -ary. The de.ire not to
impair the working capital of the company which large cash payments on dividend accumu-
lations would involve; the need for rehabilitating the credit of the company impaired by the
e-xstence of large dividend arrearages; the desire to resume regular payment of current divi-
dends; the wish to improve the market for the companies' cecurities; and the broad purpo-e
of reising and simplifying the capital structure-these and other similar motives and rea-
sons of business exigency are asserted by the management as demonstrating the need for
these recapitalization plans." SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION Or THE
WoRic, AcrIvITiEs, PERSONNEL AND FuNCTioNs oF PoTEcrrV AND REORGA.NZAT1ONS
COMMITTEES, Part VII (1938) 126. See also Note (1941) 26 MINN. L. REv. 387, dicuczing
depression period problems.
2. See KEHL, CORPORATE Ds-mENDs (1941) 214; Note (1941) 19 N.Y.U.L. Q. Rnv.
196, 197, n. 9; BERLE AND MEANs, Tma MODERN CoRForoTno AND PRIVATE Pnoemnrt
(1940) 212-3,217.
3. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
4. The Boyd case (Id. at 505), quoting Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville Ry., 174
U. S. 674, 684 (1899), states: "any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate
rights and interests of stockholders are attempted to be secured at the eapsanse of prior
rights of either class of creditors. . . ." vvas invalid. The Boyd rule, as precently stated, is
that creditors must be awarded full compensation for their claims before the rights of stack-
holders can be considered. For the result of its development in subzequent cases cee C -a v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 118, 121 (1939) (affirming the Bayd rule
and showing the importance to reorganization law of the full compensation principle; and
stating that an unsecured creditor is guaranteed protection although stockholders may have
made contributions); SEC v. U. S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 452 (1940);
In re Peyton Realty Co., 18 F. Supp. 822, 823 (E. D. Pa. 1936); Coriell v. Morris Wite,
Inc., 54 F. (2d) 255, 258 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) (creditor allowed to make decision as to whether
he will accept new form of security in payment of his debt); Kansas City Terminal Ry. v.
Central Union Trust Co., 28 F. (2d) 177, 183 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) (creditor must accept a
fair offer).
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of the assets and the financial condition of an enterprise. There is thus no
reason not to apply the principle represented by the Boyd case in recapitali-
zations. The fact that the financial difficulties of thp business are so mild
that they can be met without affecting the corporate debt is no reason why
the contractual rights of investors should be less thoroughly protected than
in reorganization. 5 But this supposition is not yet consistently borne out in
recapitalizations under state law or under the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act.'
STATE LAW
Under state law earning preferences on preferred stock have been abolished
without reference to the Boyd rule in the distribution of the new securities.
In Delaware and New York statutory authorizations of merger and reclassi-
fication of preferred shares have been construed to allow the elimination of
arrearages of cumulative and unpaid dividends without any other test of
fairness than a favorable shareholder vote.' Indeed, Delaware law has de-
clared that a recapitalization plan approved by two-thirds of the share-
5. The similarity of purpose between reorganization and recapitalization may be seen
in the statement: "Corporations, insolvent or financially embarrassed, often find it neces-
sary to scale their debts and readjust stock issues with an agreement to conduct the same
business with the same property under a reorganization." Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd,
228 U. S. 482, 502 (1913). See Ecker v. Western Pac. Ry., 318 U. S. 448, 453 (1943). See
also Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations (1942) 55 HAR .L. REv. 780, 783: "Insofar,
then, as recapitalization plans designed to eliminate accruals are instituted for the purpose
of facilitating common-share financing, such recapitalization plans do promote tile financial
health of the enterprise and thus serve a purpose somewhat similar to that served by the
scaling down of interest charges which is typical of reorganizations."
6. See notes 7 to 14 and 21 to 23 infra.
7. Havender v. Federal United Corp., 11 A. (2d) 331, 337 (Del. Sup, Ct. 1940) (sanc-
tioning merger with wholly-owned subsidiary); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A. (2d)
148 (Del. Ch. 1943), and Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1944)
(allowing elimination of arrearages through share reclassification and issuance of new class
of stock); Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
In construing the merger statute, DEL. REv. CODE (1935) §§ 2091-2093, courts have assumed
the responsibility of determining whether the proposed action was violative of shareholders'
legal rights, just as New York courts, while they have said that whether shareholders "will
be better off as minority stockholders in a corporation having an immense amount of unpaid
cumulative dividends or as majority stockholders in a corporation having no unpaid cumu-
lative dividends is a question of business judgment," have determined "whether or not
the proposal is violative of their legal rights." Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 182
Misc. 323, 325, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 33, 35 (Sup. Ct. 1943), construing the New York consolida-
tion statutes, N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§ 86, 91. For New York cases holding that the legis-
lative "reserved power" covers all aspects of share reclassification (N. Y. STocK CORP. Law
§§ 36-37) see Hinckley v. Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 478, 95 N. Y.
Supp. 357, 363 (1st Dep't 1905); Matter of Silberkraus, 250 N. Y. 242, 165 N. E. 279 (1929).
For a careful summary of this view see Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment
of Corporate Charters (1934) 32 MICH. L. REv. 743. However, the case of Davison v. Parke,
Austin & Lipscomb, 285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. (2d) 618 (1941), specifically refused to allow
the elimination of arrearages under the legislative "reserved power," following the line of
case law begun by Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906), which
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holders of each class cannot be upset save upon a shming of "bad faith." 8
In most of these cases it is an ill-disguised fact that the elimination of ar-
rearages has been undertaken not to meet real business difficulties but only
to enable dividends to be paid sooner upon common stock. Thus, recapitali-
zation is often a dev.ice for modifying the preferred-stock contract in favor of
management's common shares Without any compensating benefit to the
preferred shareholders or to the corporation.9
established the theory that cumulative preferred shareholders had a "vezted right" to
payment of their arrearages. Cases restricting the scope of legislative power are Colby v.
Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 10S N. Y. Supp. 97S (1st Dep't 1903); Yoalzam v.
Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1929); Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v.
General Plastics, Inc., 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 415 (4th Dep't 1939); Breslav v.
New York and Queens Elect. Light and Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp.
932 (2d Dep't 1936); Wiedersum v. Atlantic Cement Products, Inc., 261 App. Div. 305,
25 N. Y. S. (2d)496 (2d Dep't 1941). In Delaware this view was adhered to only co long as
Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 At. 115 (1936), was the law. Today, the Hat-
ender case, supra, has superseded it. See generally BERu.E A;D MEA:S, THE MODEMn Con-
PORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1940) 267. Thus until passage of the 1943 amendment
to the Stock Corporation Law to allow elimination of arrearages, note 10 infra, New York
authority for elimination of arrearages by indirect charter amendment v.as limited.
In some states, such as Ohio, Virginia, and now New York, arrarages may be elimi-
nated by charter amendment, provided two-thirds of the shareholders of each clas cons52nt.
Orno GE.. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) §§ 8623-14, 8623-15; VA. CODE A . (.Michie, 1942)
§ 3780; N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 36. However, most states, even Delaware, consider the
step too drastic and give recapitalization plans involving elimination of arrearages individual
attention. Even this precaution seems insufficient to assure full compensation to share-
holders for their lost arrearages in the issuance of new capital stock.
The only insurance of fairness in recapitalization plans in New Yorl= and Delaware
today is the requirement of a two-thirds vote of approval by all classes of shares. Goldman v.
Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763, 763 (D. Del. 1943); MacFarlane v. North Am.
Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 At. 396 (1928). Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp.,
53 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D. Del. 1944).
S. Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 132 Misc. 323, 328, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 33, 37
(Sup. Ct. 1943). The difficulty in proving fraud may he inferred from the remarl:s of Juztice
Walter, ". . I of course am not to be understood as holding that a court of equity could
not intervene where fraud or bad faith is shown. No such showing is made in the papers
now before the court. True, plaintiffs say that the plan is so unfair to the preferred stock-
holders, in favor of the common stockholders, that it amounts to fraud, but . . .that is
here nothing more than an emphatic way of saying that as a matter of buzinezs judgment
plaintiffs would rather keep what they now have." Delaware not only requires no statutory
standard of fairness, but also demands that the stockholder prove "bad faith" or "grozz un-
fairness" to incur judicial disapproval of a plan. Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F.
Supp. 198, 20?, 205 (D. Del. 1944); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A. (2d) 143, 151 (Del.
Ch. 1943).
9. Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 193, 203 (D. Del. 1944) (plan ad-
mittedly to benefit of common stockholders w.as allowed although company could well have
paid something on preferred arrearages); Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.
(2d) 944 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) (arrearages were eliminated and common stock vas awarded
17% interest on recapitalization although arrearages exceeded equity above par value of
cumulative preferred stock).
Recapitalization for the benefit of common shares is denounced by Profez-or E. M.
1945l
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The 1943 amendment to the New York Stock Corporation Law,'0 declared
constitutional in McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane," allows a corporation to elimi-
nate arrearages of cumulative unpaid dividends by charter amendment on
the approval of two-thirds of the stockholders of each class. Although the
Sloane Company made over $1,000,000 profits in 1944, recapitalization was
requested in order to pay dividends sooner on common stock and "to con-
serve its current cash for the termination of . . .war contracts and for
restoring maximum peacetime activities." 12 Pursuant to the amendment,
management proposed a redistribution of ownership and voting interests
and the elimination of arrearages. Although the plan itself was approved at
a meeting of all classes of shares, a preferred shareholder later brought suit
to test the validity of the amendment. In declaring direct elimination of
arrearages to be within the legislative "reserved power," Judge Shientag
failed even to mention the desirability of strict priority in the distribution
of new securities and did not indicate how the priority of the preferred shares
was to be measured in such a distribution." Possibly he regarded the right
of appraisal provided by the statute to dissenting shares as sufficient com-
Dodd in Note (1944) 57 HARv. L. REv. 894, 899: "It would be better not to permit ..
[recapitalization] at all than to allow it to become a means of transferring corporate earnings
from the pockets of the preferred to those of common shareholders."
10. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 36 (E) allows the "creation, alteration or abolition ...
of any provisions or rights in respect of . . . (b) any cumulative . . .dividends, whether
or not accrued, which shall not have been declared. .. ."
11. McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
12. W. & J. SLOANE, NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKIOLDERS, Oct. 5, 1944,
Open Letter and p. 16. The statement of Net Sales and Profit or Los- shows a steady in-
crease of profits from 1942-1944.
13. Judge Shientag upheld the amendment as to dividends accruing before or after
passage of the act. After elaborating on the breadth of the legislative "reserved power" to
authorize the alteration of a shareholder's rights by charter amendment, he assails the con-
tention that the right to arrearages is vested. The problem as he sees it is not whether the
right is vested, but rather the legislative intent as to it. See Matter of Kinney, 279 N. Y.
423, 18 N. E. (2d) 645 (1939). In support of the legislature's power he argues that a prefer-
ential right is a valuable one but "does not give rise to a chose in action which may be
alienated or devised." These arguments appear to sidestep the main issue. To say that a
preference right is or is not a property right seems as irrelevant as the "vested rights" theory
which the Judge properly disregards. The question he fails to answer is whether any amend-
ment is permissible if management can obtain a favorable shareholder vote, even if not made
on terms fully compensatory to senior shareholder interests. 54 N. Y. S. (2d) at 260.
After reading the Sloane opinion, one is no clearer as to when and under what restraints
the corporation may undertake recapitalization. If the amendment is construed, as here, to
wipe out restraints on full corporate power such as those laid down in the Wiedersum case
(allowing changes in capital stock to operate only prospectively) and the Dat4son case (re-
fusing to allow elimination of arrearages without specific legislative authority), what pro-
tection of preferred stock contract rights remains? See Wiedersum v, Atlantic Cement
Products, Inc., 261 App. Div. 305, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 496 (2d Dep't 1941); Davison v. Parke,
Austin & Lipscomb, 285 N. Y. 500, 35 N. E. (2d) 618 (1941). If the courts conclude, as does
Judge Shientag, that questions of "administrative control" or "prior judicial approval"
are not within the scope of judicial review, one may well ask what legal or equitable devices
[Vol. 54: 840
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pensation for the loss of preferential rights involved in the elimination of
arrearages.14 But appraisal rights are hardly a sufficient alternative to strict
priority in the distribution of new securities. Assuming appraisal value to be
largely dependent upon the market value of the stock, appraisal cannot,
as a practical matter, fully compensate the stockholder for surrendering his
interest in the corporation; for, whereas the opportunity to realize corporate
earnings in the future may be appreciable, the market value may well be low
because of past arrearages. The result seems to be that a dissenting share-
holder may retain or release his interest in the corporation without being
fully compensated for loss of preferential rights.
The principal argument in Delaware and New York for upholding re-
capitalizations of the Sloane variety is that by implication the power to
amend is part of the shareholder's investment contract with the company.
The shareholder purchased stock, the courts say, subject not only to the
explicit terms of his contract with the corporation, but to the implied condi-
tion that under statutory authority the charter could be amended by the
corporation.'" The argument, while orthodox, is irrelevant. The power to
amend, like other corporate powers, is a power in trust. The management
do exist to insure the "fairness" of a plan to all classes of shares? 54 N. Y. S. (2d) at 262.
The importance of this question is stressed in Dodd, Fair and Equitabe Recapitalizations
(1942) 55 HARv. L. R~v. 780.
14. In declaring the amendment sufficient to the legislative purpose sought to be ac-
complished, Judge Shientag states, "The Legislature sought to guard against possible evil
consequences by requiring a sufficient notice to stockholders, and a vote by the holders of
record of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of stock ard by gi ing disscnting
stockiwiders thw right to an appraisal qf their holdings and payment for them in cash." (Empha-
sis supplied.) McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 253, 262 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Statutes
typically call for appraisal of the "value," "fair cash value," or "full market value" of stock.
The New York statute calls for payment of "the value" of the appraised stoc:. N.Y. StocrK
CoRp. LAw §§ 21, 87. Under any method it appears that arrearages will lower the market
value and lessen the stockholder's cash payment because of the relatively low earning power
of the corporation. See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stochholders Under Appraisal Statutes,
(1931) 45 HARv. L. Rnv. 233, 253, 270. Professor Dodd says, "The fair value of preferred
shares in an enterprise with .. . [a poor] dividend record is a matter of great uncertainty,
so that the amount which a shareholder would recover in appraisal proceedings is largely
unpredictable. For that and other reasons, few shareholders exercise their appraisal rights
even when there is strong reason for regarding the terms of a merger as unfair.
"An appraisal right is not as a practical matter an adequate substitute for judicial
scrutiny of the fairness of a recapitalization plan." Note (1944) 37 HARv. L. REv. 894, 895.
Without an appraisal right, however, the stockholder's "option" to exchange old steel:
for new or to remain in the same position is even less of a safeguard to the "fairness" of the
plan, since more often than not the shareholder feels compelled to accept the plan. Meck,
Accrued Diridends on Cumulative Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine (1941) 55 Htnv. L.
Rv. 71, 79; Note (1940) 8 U. Op Cm. L. Rnv. 134, 136-7; Note (1941) 54 Hrv. L. Rnv.
488, 491; Comment (1941) 39 1%cn. L. Rav. 1201, 1203.
15. Meck, supra note 14, at 74, discusses the enlargement of the term "corporate
charter" to include all constitutionally acceptable amendments, and the development of the
charter into a tripartite contract: a contract between the corporation and the state, another
between the corporation and its stockholders, and a third between the stoczholders inter
1945]
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and the majority can arrange for its exercise only for a proper corporate
purpose. It should be used fairly, in the light of the ideas of fairness devel-
oped by the reorganization cases which have followed and interpreted
Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd. If the altered financial condition of the
corporation requires recapitalization or reorganization, the blow should fall
first on the most junior interests. If recapitalization according to absolute
priority would eliminate the junior class of shares from future participation,
management can refuse to recapitalize in the hope of eventually paying off
dividend arrearages. It then has the prospect of ultimately achieving a
sufficiently liquid position to pay dividends on common stock. If business
conditions really demand recapitalization, and if enforcement of the absolute
priority rule would eliminate common from future participation, manage-
ment should face the fact that common presently has no equity. Such in-
stances arise frequently in reorganization cases.' 6
sese. Thus an individual's rights are affected not only by the amendments to the charter,
but by the amount of reserved power'of the legislature to authorize amendments, and by
the number and value of all classes of shares issued. See also 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY
OF CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1941) 1247-8, note r, for a presentation of both the view for and
against violation of a shareholder's contract rights through charter amendment; Note (1941)
89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 789, 792; Ober, The Problem of Funding Accrued Dividends it Maryland
(1941) 5 MD. L. REv. 345 (discussion of same three types of contracts without explicit list-
ing); Note (1937) 23 VA. L. REV. 579 (similar twofold contractual relationship discussed);
Johnson v. Fuller, 36 F. Supp. 744, 747 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
For cases upholding the view that the investor consents in advance to certain changes
in his contract when such changes are approved by the requisite number of shareholders see
Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 122 Atl. 696, 701 (Del. Ch. 1923); Peters v. U. S. Mort-
gage Co., 114 AtI. 598 (Del. Ch. 1921); Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 197
Ati. 489, 493 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A. (2d) 331, 338
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1940); see also Note (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 789, 792; Note (1941) 54
HARV. L. REV. 1368. It appears that whether cases hold valid or invalid the power to elimi-
nate accrued dividends, the majority of them admit of the basic authority of corporations to
alter charters for a variety of purposes.
Note (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 789, 793, sums up briefly the fields in which the amend-
ment power has been exercised, listing capital stock, voting rights, and shareholder liability
as the most often sanctioned. Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 558-9 161 N. E. 179, 182
(1928), allowed issuance of a new class of stock under authority to "alter preferences,"
while Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, 285 N. Y. 500, 505, 35 N. E. (2d) 618, 621
(1941), although refusing to allow elimination of arrearages without specific authority,
stated "the preferential rights that may be altered by filing an amended certificate are not,
however, expressly defined or limited by statute."
The gradual enlargement of general statutory powers of a corporation to include the elim-
ination of arrearages, Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 33 (Sup. Ct.
1943), has paved the way for statutory approval without simultaneously demanding of the
corporation an affirmative showing of the fairness of a recapitalization plan.
16. The most recent examples are Ecker v. Western Pac. Ry., 318 U. S., 448, 475, 478
(1943) where stockholders' and unsecured creditors' interests were declared to be without
value in reorganization of the railroad; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. R., 318 U. S. 523, 541-2 (1943), eliminating preferred and
common shareholder interests on reorganization.
[Vol. 54: 840
THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT PRIORITY
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY Acr
Unlike state statutes, the Public Utility Holding Company Act specifi-
cally provides that recapitalizations under Section 11 shall be "fair and
equitable," 17 presumably adopting that phrase as embodying the doctrine
of strict priority.'8 The SEC, however, has consistently upheld the partici-
pation of common shares in recapitalization even where liquidation has been
specifically decreed and the liquidation preferences of preferred found to
exceed the going concern value of corporate assets.Y
The position of the SEC results not from a rejection of the principle of
strict priority, but from its denial of the need to measure priorities by the
liquidation preferences of preferred shares. The Commission recognizes the
Boyd rule as a means of enforcing the preferences of investment contracts,
which, in the case of preferred stock, are the fixed-amount preference on
liquidation and the percentage preference as to income during the life of the
business. Furthermore, it recognizes the adoption of the "fixed principle"
of the Boyd rule in the "fair and equitable" standard of Section 11(e).- 3
But the SEC, and the majority of the United States Supreme Court, assert
that recapitalization is not "liquidation" within the meaning of the preferred
stock contract. 2' Thus, in arriving at a "fair and equitable" participation of
the various classes of stock, the Commission considers liquidation prefer-
ences only one factor in an "over-all valuation" in which "the immediately
17. 49 STAT. 822 (1935); 15 U. S. C. § 79 k(b) (1940).
18. In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 SEC 893, 924 (1941), where Com-
missioner Healy stated: "The words 'fair and equitable' are 'words of art' and embody a
'fixed principle,' which has had a well understood meaning for sometime. It is the 'rgorous
standard' of the Boyd case, as the Supreme Court has called it." See Case v. Lo' Angeles
Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 120 (1939).
19. In thw Matter of United Light and Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 4215, April 6, 1943. And this is true even where liquidation of the corporation involved
has been ordered. In a prior case it had been stated that:
"In some instances the appropriate Commission order under Section 11(b) might re-
quire liquidation. In such cases a Section 11(e) plan would be a substitute for liquidation,
and the words 'fair and equitable,' on such facts, would yield the same result as if the com-
pany were the debtor in a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding." In the Matter of Fcderal
Water Service Corp., 8 SEC 893, 910 (1941).
Yet in the United Light and Power Co. case, supra, the Commission refused to apply
strict priority even though the recapitalization plan provided for the liquidation of the
United Light and Power Co. This decision has been recently upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Otis & Co. v. SEC, 65 Sup. Ct. 483 (U. S. 1945).
20. See note 18 supra.
21. "The exercise of legislative power by Congress through section 11(b)(2) to accom-
plish simplification as a matter of public policy and the Commission's administration of the
Act by dissolution of this particular company iMaryland's United Light and Power] results
in a type of liquidation which is entirely distinct from the 'liquidation of the corporation,
whether voluntary or involuntary,' envisaged by the charter provisions of Power for prefer-
ences to the senior stock." Otis & Co. v. SEC, 65 Sup. Ct. 43, 487 (U. S. 1945). S,.e also
In the nwatter of United Light and Powcr Co., SEC Holding Company Act Relea No. 4215,
April 6, 1943, pp. 8-9; In ite Matter of Puget Sound Power - Light Co., SEC Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 4255, April 28, 1943, p. 22.
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operative rights (e.g., rights to dividends)" are more important.22 Provided
reasonably anticipated earnings exceed the present dividend requirements
of preferred, common stock may then be said to have some value and to be
entitled to participation.23
The reason for the' SEC's refusal to measure priorities by the liquidation
preferences of preferred is most clearly discerned in the distinction made
between reorganization, where "liquidation is in the air," and recapitaliza-
tion. It is only in reorganization cases, says the Commission, that "the
touchstone of the 'fair and equitable' standard-the recognition of con-
tractual rights-requires compensation for a matured right to a liquidating
priority." The Commission feels that since creditors, ". . . absent assump-
tion of jurisdiction by a court of equity or a court of bankruptcy under the
22. In the Matter of Southern Colorado Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 4501, August 24, 1943, p. 16. See also In the Matter of United Light and Power Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 4215, April 6, 1943, p. 13, stating that although it may
not be necessary to make an over-all valuation of the enterprise, it is necessary "to examine
into the respective existing interests of the preferred and common stockholders in the earn.
ings of the enterprise" to weigh the fairness of a proposed plan; In the Matter of Virginia
Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4618, Oct. 16, 1943, p. 27, reason-
ing that "the interests of the common stock must be measured by an evaluation of senior
claims as a whole, giving proper emphasis to those claims that are immediately operative
(such as the claims to interest and preferred dividends), and giving less significance to those
claims (such as the liquidation preference of the preferred stock) which are inchoate rights."
23. See In the Matter of Community Power and Light Co., 6 SEC 182, 193 (1939). In
discussing common's right to participation, the Commission says, "At the present time the
corporate earnings exceed the preferred dividend requirement and the forecasts of future
earnings point to a still further improvement. It may be assumed, therefore, that, although
it will take many years before the present common stock can hope for a return, especially in
view of the crippling effect of the present capital structure, nevertheless there is an eventual
prospect which must be regarded as having a present value. . .. Nevertheless, the possi-
bility that there may eventually be dividends available for the common stock is such that
we cannot say that the common stock has no value, and we therefore believe that it is en-
titled to some participation in the company."
The idea in full is that, since the anticipated earnings exceed the dividend requirements
-of preferred as they exist under the corporate structure prior to recapitalization, an amount
will be left over at the end of each fiscal year to be applied to the payment of dividend ar-
rearages. Assuming earnings will continue as anticipated, arrearages will be paid off at the
end of a certain number of years. Thereafter the excess of earnings over preferred dividend
requirements will be available to common. No matter how remote the time when common
-would receive earnings, if it were not for the intervention of recapitalization under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act, the eventual possibility is said to constitute a worth vested
in common which must be recognized by granting common participation in the recapitaliza-
tion.
In KEEL, CORPORATE DivmEzNs (1941) 217-8, the author also measures common's
right to future participation by the degree to which the current earnings of the corporation
are "in excess of the annual dividend requirements on the preferred. . . ." But the com-
parison here offered of Community Power and Light case, supra, and In re Utilities Power &
Light Corp. 29 F. Supp. 763 (N. D. Ill. 1939) shows that when preferred capital itself was
seriously impaired there was no reason to give common a continuing interest.
In granting common shares a participation the Commission raises a vexing problem:
how and by what criteria is the amount of participation to be measured. For example, in
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reorganization provisions, would have had the common law right ... to
dismember the corporation, it is 'fair and equitable' to distribute the assets
on the basis of the contractual rights of the parties as if in liquidation." 24
Later the Commission remarks concerning recapitalization, "In such cases,
apart from Section 11(b) of the Holding Company Act, no one has the right
to force liquidation of the enterprise." 25
The Commission's contention seems to be that strict priority measured
by liquidation preferences is employed in reorganization to compensate
creditors for the statutory abrogation of their right to force liquidation and
to share in the assets of the dissolved corporation. Since preferred share-
holders have no such right, strict priority as measured by liquidation prefer-
ences is not applicable to recapitalizations under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act.
25
Otis & Co. v. SEC, 65 Sup. Ct. 483 (U. S. 1945), assuming the rightfulness of common's par-
ticipation, why was a 4.5% participation in the new securities allowed rather than 15%?
The difficulty in measuring common's participation is aptly illustrated in In the Matter
of Amterican Utilities Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5114, June 22, 1944,
where a plan which excluded common completely was disapproved after analyzing the cor-
porate earning power from the following viewpoints: (1) amount of reasonably forezaamble
earnings, (2) amount of such which may be prudently distributed, (3) increae resulting
from the reinvestment in the business of such portion of these earnings as are not distributed,
(4) the length of time probably required to pay off accrued arrearages, (5) the maldng of due
compensation to the preferred stockholders for giving up their preferential position, (6) the
possible reduction in fixed charges, (7) amounts potentially realizable if the company is
liquidated. On the basis of these measures, common were awarded a 15% interest. The
issue arises as to how much window dressing is allowable to maintain an interest for common
shareholders before it is apparent their present equity is nothing. None of the above repre-
sent an accurate index for measurement.
24. In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corporation, 8 SEC 893, 909 (1941); Eee also
In the Matter of United Light and Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215,
April 6, 1943, pp. 9-10. In the latter the Commission says, "Creditors and other claimants
are prevented from foreclosing or otherwise compelling an actual liquidation, but new Escuri-
ties are distributed among them according to their contractual and other rights determined
as though in liquidation."
See also Dodd, The Relative Rights of Preferred and Common Shareholders in Rccapitali-
zation Plans Under the Holding Company Act (1944) 57 Hnv. L. REv. 295, 301.
25. In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 SEC 893, 909 (1941).
26. Even where the liquidation of a corporation is ordered under Section 11 of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act the Commission refuses to apply the doctrine of strict
priority. See the United Light and Power case discussed in note 19 supra. The "fair and
equitable" standard specifically set out by Congress in § 11(e) would seem to have no appli-
cation to any possible kind of recapitalization under the Act, unless one accepts the rationali-
zation of the Otis & Co. v. SEC case that strict priority is being applied by the Commission
to going concerns. 65 Sup. Ct. 483, 489 (U. S. 1945).
In the Otis case, supra, the dissenting opinion argued that, pursuant to the dictum of
the Commission in the Federal Water Service Corp. case, the Boyd rule should apply bacausa
the Commission had ordered the dissolution of United Light and Power. As the majority
opinion points out, "liquidation" pursuant to a Section 11 order is not "liquidation" ithin
the meaning of the preferred stock contract because the business of the dissolved corpora-
tion is continued. The dangers of the dissenting opinion's view are well pointed out by
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The distinction made by the Commission is extremely vulnerable. If the
Boyd doctrine only compensates creditors for loss of their right to enforce
liquidation, no grounds can be discerned for applying strict priority in favor
of preferred shareholders even in reorganization. Yet it is clearly established
that in reorganization senior stock claims, as well as creditors' claims, must
be fully compensated before participation by junior securities is allowed.Y
One might protest that reorganization is "liquidation" within the meaning
of investment contracts, and that therefore, unlike recapitalization, reor-
ganization matures preferred claims.2s But here the argument'lifts itself by
its bootstraps. If reorganization were really liquidation, it would not be
necessary to compensate creditors for loss of their "right" to liquidate. Ob-
viously reorganization does not involve dissolution of the corporation and
distribution of assets any more than recapitalization; both preserve cor-
porations as going concerns. Moreover, the SEC's distinction is vulnerable
from another aspect. The conception of "strict" priority as compensation
for the abandonment of a supposed common-law right to judicial sale misses
the practical point that, under the rules of fairness developed by the courts,
reorganization must be shown to be an alternative to liquidation preferable
to creditors. Reorganizations cannot be confirmed unless they are shown to
provide more for creditors than they would receive upon liquidation. In
many instances, of course, as with railroads or utilities, there is no real alter-
Professor'E. M. Dodd in Note (1945) 58 HARV. L. REV. 604, 609. As Professor Dodd re-
marks, ". . . one can hardly doubt that the average security holder of Power would have
been far more likely than not to have assumed that the extent of his participation in the
simplified enterprise would be substantially the same regardless of what the method of sim-
plification might be." But we can hardly go along with the next sentence: "It may, there-
fore, fairly be said that to characterize a plan which accomplishes that result as a fair and
equitable plan is to keep faith with the spirit of the Boyd doctrine even if it is to fail to
adhere to its letter." Rather, we agree with Professor Dodd's next remark: "For the under-
lying purpose of the doctrine is that the reasonable expectations of corporate creditors and
corporate investors with respect to their priorities shall not be defeated as a result of changes
in the financial structure of an enterprise." I.e., the Boyd rule should apply to enforce in-
vestment contracts in any kind of a recapitalization.
27. Junior' securities may otherwise participate only if they contribute new money to
the reorganized corporation. Such contribution is desirable when a corporation seeks new
money essential to its success. "Where that necessity exists and the old stockholders make a
fresh contribution and receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their con-
tribution, no objection can be made." Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S.
106, 121 (1939), citing in accord both the Boyd case and Kansas City Terminal Ry. v.
Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (1926).
28. In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 SEC 893, 910-1 (1941). The ma-
jority opinion also sagaciously counsels that "We must, as Mr. Justice Holmes warned,
'think things not words.' It will not do to argue that a reorganization is a reorganization,
no matter why begun or under what circumstances . ..." Thereafter the opinion blandly
proceeds: "Such reasoning assumes that the contractual rights which underlie the 'fair and
equitable' test are always liquidation rights. As we have just shown, this is not true in noti-
liquidation situations."' (Emphasis supplied.) For some reason it seems that whereas "it will
not do to argue that reorganization is always reorganization," it will do very well to argue
that liquidation is always liquidation-even when it is reorganization. 8 SEC at 911 (1941).
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native to reorganization, and it is artificial and misleading to talk of liquida-
tion as being "in the air." 2
Other arguments of the Commission do not proceed in terms of the appli-
cation or non-application of a rule of strict priority measured by liquidation
preferences; rather they are phrased to justify the participation of common
shares in the recapitalized corporation.-3 For example, it is asserted that the
limitation upon preferred's right to receive dividends is a valuable right
vested in common; for, if the statute did not exist, common would have the
opportunity to realize the possibiliy of receiving earnings after the corpora-
tion had paid off dividend arrearages of preferred. This heretofore existing
right is said to have a worth which must be compensated in the recapitaliza-
tion." But an argument based on a hypothesis contrary to fact is hardly
cogent; the statute does eist, and cuts off any right of the common shares
to avoid recapitalization. Equally, if, for a strong corporate financial reason,
recapitalization is necessary under state law, rights can hardly be measured
as if recapitalization were unnecessary and could have been refused.
Beneath the reasoning--or rationalizing-of the Commission and the
courts lies the traditional categorical distinction between "debts" (bonds)
and "ownership claims" (stocks). The Commission seems to feel that the
application of strict priority in recapitalization to the extent of the liquida-
tion preferences of preferred stock would be treating preferred-stock claims
as matured debtsa 2 But, if preferred claims were actually treated as ma-
29. See First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934); and the
following sections of the National Bankruptcy Act: 52 STAT. S36 (1933), 11 U. S. C. § 530
{7) (1940); 52 STAT. 887 (1933), 11 U. S. C. § 546 (3) (1940); 52 STAT. 899 (1938), 11 U. S. C.
636 (1940).
30. See In the Matter of Community Power and Light Co., 6 SEC 182 (1939); In the
.Mfatter qf Federal Water Service Corp., 8 SEC 893 (1941); In the Matter of United Light and
Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215, April 6, 1943; In the Matter of
.Puget Sound Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4255, April 28,
1943; In the Matter of Southern Colorado Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releasa
No. 4501, Aug. 24, 1943; In the Matter of Virginia Public Serrice Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 4618, Oct. 16, 1943. See also Otis & Co. v. SEC, 65 Sup. Ct. 4,3 (U. S.
1945).
31. See discussion in note 23 supra. In the Matter of International Paper and Power
Co., 2 SEC 1004, 1023-4 (1937), Commissioner Healy states in a dissent:
"It is difficult to observe without some concern the extent to which stockholderc, in
many companies, who in good faith believed they were paying their money for a genuinely
preferred position, have . . . through the bargaining leverage of common stockholdingo,
been euchered, cajoled, coerced, elbowed and traded out of their legal rights." As ProfczZor
Dodd says, "The bargain between preferred and common shareholders, that the former shall
be preferred in liquidation but shall have no power to compel liquidation, is a bargain which
is well understood by investors." He later states that the Chandler Act and the Investment
Company Act have outlawed the bargain betAeen shareholders whereby common may elect
-directors and control the enterprise although the value of the assets of the corporation might
be less than preferred liquidation preferences. Dodd, supra note 24, at 301.
32. See In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 SEC S93, 910-1 (1941), where
he majority opinion speaks of a senior class of stock as "an inchoate right to a future pay-
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tured, they would be entitled to payment in cash after judicial sale of cor-
porate assets, while the strict priority proposed here does not pretend to
give preferred any right to cash payment. Given recapitalization, which is a
realignment of ownership interests within a corporation, the rule declares
only that in reorganization or recapitalization the status and participation
of preferred stock in the new securities is to be measured by its liquidation
preferences. The actual distribution of assets in accordance with the extent
of ownership would still be contingent upon future actual liquidation.
CONCLUSION
The idea behind the Boyd case can be used to enforce the preferences set
forth in investment contracts in situations not mentioned in those con-
tracts: reorganization and recapitalization. To date the net result of the
failure to apply the Boyd doctrine in recapitalization has been effectively to
emasculate cumulative preferred stock contracts, and to make them inher-
ently misleading to investors. Since recapitalization under state law and
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act cuts off preferences in the
payment of dividends and the distribution of assets upon liquidation, the
preferred stockholder pays more money, takes more risk of loss, and has less
chance of gain than the common stockholder. In all honesty to the investing
public, the fact that preferred stock rights may possibly be wiped out in
recapitalization should be made explicit in the stock contract. Otherwise,
in an economy which depends upon the free flow of capital from private in-
vestors, to corporations the circumvention of investment contracts in recapi-
talization may well restrict investment, limit the usefulness of a desirable
form of investment contract, and endanger the success of corporate enter-
prise.
ment, which has no definite maturity date ... " It is also said that the present right to
current and accumulated dividends ". . . is not absolute, as is a creditor's right to interest;
it is only a relative right vis a vis junior classes of stock."
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